The Prejudice Against Prejudice:
A Reply to the Comments
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Apologia

Surely anyone who reads these comments can attest not only to their high quality but also to their widely varying positions. There is no question in our minds that the editor has served the readers well in his selection of commentators. Yet, the possibility of truly doing justice to each of these well-reasoned and tightly argued comments seems quite remote, especially given our limited space. Instead, we have chosen the more thematic route of “points at issue,” hoping the authors of these comments will see our replies to them as we attempt to tackle the issues they raise. We realize, however, that this approach tends to highlight disagreements, so our final section explores more deliberately the implications of some agreements.

Introduction

Hans-Georg Gadamer (2004) may be the most noted for our title phrase, “the prejudice against prejudice” (p. 273), but we believe this phrase helps us to capture the issues of the commentaries in several important senses. First, Gadamer’s understanding of prejudice is similar to our own in this dialogue. Prejudice is not meant in the traditional pejorative sense of malicious intent or hostile action. Rather, prejudices are the prejudgments, conscious or unconscious, that form the horizons of meaning which orient us whenever we attempt to understand. This sense of prejudice does not mean that the effects of the more conventional prejudices do not apply. As we will argue, our professional prejudgments have important consequences for a large portion of psychology’s clientele, if not the profession itself.
The second sense in which this title phrase reflects our response is that we view theism and religion as societal scapegoats for the prejudice against this prejudice, especially in academic culture. Because religion has been viewed as value-laden, bias-filled, and generally subjective in the worst sense, this prejudice against religious people being prejudiced has taken its toll—so much so that religion is often derided, as Alcock commented, as having “no way of determining the truth” (p. 4). The mainstream of psychology, on the other hand, seems to view science as objective in the best sense, with few, if any, values or biases to distort their determination of the truth. We argue, however, that this notion of a bias-free or even a bias-minimized psychology is a myth.

We are particularly intrigued with how these bias-free notions seemed to manifest themselves in a third sense of the prejudice against prejudice. Instead of taking into account inescapable prejudgments, several commentators seem to be striving to be “as free from metaphysical assumptions as is possible” (Bishop, p. 3). In short, they are prejudiced against, and thus attempting to avoid, prejudices in their research. As we will argue, however, we believe that radically alternative worldviews, such as theism or Sundararajan’s ganlei, call into question these attempts at “neutral” inquiry (Bishop, p. 4). Indeed, anyone who reads the articles of this special issue would be hard-pressed not to see how all manner of pivotal conceptual issues are raised in bold relief, just because an interloper—theism—is included in the conversation. As we will describe, the productive dialogue of this special Journal issue is just one of the many benefits that this inclusion brings psychology.

Points at Issue

Our reply is not meant to close off the discussion or to put certain issues to rest. Rather, we are interested in a continuing dialogue on these difficult but significant issues. We believe
that such a dialogue is best served by clarifying some of the major “points at issue.” Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, we noticed in the comments a number of misconceptions about our position. These seemed almost inevitable, given the intellectual scope of our original paper, its space limitations, and the lack of consensual validation on theistic terms in psychology. Consequently, we also offer several clarifications in light of the comments.

**Issue 1: Are we trying to make psychology into a theistic enterprise?**

One of the main purposes of our original article was to point to some of the biases of a widely used framework or worldview for psychology—naturalism. We are concerned that many psychologists accept a kind of myth that this disciplinary framework is neutral or unbiased, or, in Gadamer’s (2004) terms, devoid of “prejudgments” or “prejudices” (p. 273). We wanted to dispel this myth by comparing it to another prominent worldview in Western culture, theism. Our experience with several other scholarly projects (e.g., Slife, Reber, & Richardson, 2005) is that some worldviews and sets of assumptions, such as naturalism, can become so familiar that they enjoy a kind of axiomatic or truistic status, unless they have alternative worldviews and assumptions with which to contrast them. Theism provides that contrast because it entails a different epistemology, if not a different ontology. We have no doubt that theism itself can function in a similarly axiomatic manner in certain religious contexts.

We do agree with several commentators that our particular choice of contrast was not random or whimsical. Calling attention to the prejudices against theism, as Hibberd implies (p. 1), indicates our own prejudgment that theism is worthy for psychologists to consider. Although we attempt to justify our selection of theism in Issues 3 and 6, our judgment concerns theism’s *promise* for psychology, not its ultimate *validity*. In this sense, we do not perceive theism to be “as valid as naturalism” for psychology as Hibberd (p. 1) asserts, or “equally
legitimate” as Stenner (p. 3) discusses. Theism’s ultimate validity and legitimacy for psychology are yet to be decided, but its promise is another issue entirely. After all, theism is naturalism’s chief rival for the dominant worldview of Western culture (Smith, 2001). We believe it should be allowed to take its place in the market of psychological ideas, to fail or succeed. We just want alternative views, including Sundararajan’s approach to emotion and Vande Kemp’s perspective on illusion, to get a “fair shot.”

Fairness is a primary reason for our raising the question of prejudice in the first place. We agree with Richardson that alternative views “need to take the next step” and “articulate compelling reasons for giving them serious consideration” (p. 8). However, the reason this is the next step is because the criteria for deciding “compelling reasons” must take into account possible disciplinary prejudices. If, for example, there really is a prejudice against theism in psychology, then no theistic program of psychological research (Issue 6) could ever be “compelling” because an incompatible worldview, naturalism, would control the criteria for what compelling means. This is also the reason we favor an open, rather than a closed, canon for the philosophies, and thus criteria, underlying science (Issue 3).

Issue 2: Are we ultimately arguing for some kind of dualism?

As we described in our original article, we consider the principals of this dialogue, naturalism and theism, to be worldviews and not worlds in the ontological or dualistic sense (p. 10). These worldviews are possible interpretive elements of our meanings in and of the world, but they are not in a separation of subjective interpretation and objective world. Rather, they are in a hermeneutic-like whole of meaningful experience (Packer & Addison, 1989; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). As such, our use of theism and naturalism should not be mistaken for the ontological “worlds” of the supernatural and the natural that create the dualism Hibberd
and Stenner identified. In fact, we explicitly warned in our initial paper against making these “worlds of meaning” into the untenable dualism of natural and supernatural (p. 10). As Hibberd correctly notes, this dualism raises a host of questions about the nature and existence of God, just as it raises a host of questions for the naturalist about laws and forces.

We understand, however, that our early discussion in the initial paper could have been interpreted in this ontologically dualistic manner, but our purpose at that point was to bring the reader in slowly with “events” talk, and then explicitly qualify these concepts later. Indeed, we clearly stated that the natural and the supernatural, in Stenner’s sense, participate in the problems of dualism that we described (p. 13). We specifically noted that “naturalism is often mistaken for natural, the supposedly common events between the two worldviews.” Our focus was, instead, “the worldview of naturalism—or world of meanings in the Heideggerian sense,” and not some physical or non-physical world per se (p. 10).

In this sense, we are not making specific claims about the ontological status of God’s existence and activity in the world, just as we are not speaking to the ontological status of natural laws (though some naturalists and theists might). We realize that this will likely not satisfy Hibberd, who denies that our notion of incompatibility can be a “logical relation” between two meanings or worldviews (p. 7). Without more space, we can only refer here to a long line of scholars (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1975) who have treated incompatibility as a logical relation, perhaps most relevantly Richard Bernstein (1983) who explicitly considers incompatibility a “logical” relation among worldviews or paradigms (p. 82; see also Slife, 2000). Moreover, theists are not themselves, at least necessarily, caught in this dualism of incoherence, as Hibberd implies. Consider, for example, Marcus Borg’s (1997) description of panentheism, a monistic unity of both the immanence and transcendence of God.
Our meaning of incompatibility stems ultimately from a simple contrasting relationship: theists require God as a primordial premise (see Issue 5) and naturalists deny this requirement. Naturalists, of course, have other first premises. Our point here is that this contrasting relation of God-required/God-not-required is a logical contradiction or incompatibility—both cannot be affirmed in the same time and place. Our original article went on to ask whether the theist’s “God assumption” is an altering or add-on assumption. If it is an altering assumption, as we argued, then this incompatible relation with one assumption becomes an incompatible relation across the system of assumptions, and thus worldviews. As Gergen agrees, “assumptions within one tradition [can], if added to the mix of an alternative tradition, be substantially refiguring” (p. 3-4). Still, following Bernstein (1983) again, this incompatible relation between worldviews does not prevent dialogue and productive interchange, as this special Journal issue illustrates. In fact, we contended in our initial article that the flourishing of dialogue is jeopardized without a firm grasp of contrasting as well as similarity relations (see also Slife, 2005).

**Issue 3: Does theism’s involvement make science impossible?**

The answer to this question hinges on what “science” is. If we identify science with a specific epistemology (e.g., traditional empiricism), as Alcock seems to, then many of the deeper meanings of theism would be problematic (see Issue 6). If, on the other hand, we consider science more broadly, with investigation of all kinds as its hallmark, then a pluralism of epistemologies would seem to be possible and theism in its fullest sense could be included. We realize that this raises the specter of relativism for some (e.g., Hibberd), but pluralism does not have to mean a harmful relativism (e.g., Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999; Widdershoven, 1992).
Indeed, is not the rise of many qualitative approaches an indication that pluralism is already the current status of psychology’s methodology? APA’s own policy statement on evidenced-based practice touts a “variety of research designs and methodologies” (APA 2005, p. 1), including qualitative methods. We would also remind Alcock that there is no empirical evidence for the epistemology of traditional empiricism. Alcock might claim that this philosophy has been historically successful, but this is only a claim or an opinion, not a scientific fact. To be a scientific fact is deeply problematic because empiricism would have to be systematically tested or compared against another epistemology. Needless to say, this testing has not occurred, if for no other reason than it creates the problem of what epistemology would be used to guide the test.

This is not to say that theism would have to avoid empiricism. As we describe and illustrate in Issue #6, many theistic hypotheses and constructs are testable through conventional quantitative and qualitative methods. However, we should recognize that serious theists have long used alternative epistemologies to “test” their ideas (Stiver, 2003). Some of these epistemologies, admittedly, are more associated with the humanities, but surely the readers of this journal can understand how advancements of science can occur theoretically and philosophically. Even so, most practicing theists are epistemological pragmatists in the sense that they see what William James (1907/2009) called the “cash value” (p. 52) of their beliefs. The point is that we do not view science as a closed system, nor do we view it as so open that harmful relativisms flourish. We prefer what some call the middle ground of hermeneutics, which can include a variety of epistemologies and philosophies of science. As with Dupre’ (1993) and others (e.g., Feyerabend, 1975), we would reframe Alcock’s fear of “Pandora’s box” in psychology as an opportunity for creativity, not chaos.
Issue 4: Is psychology’s treatment of theism truly a form of prejudice?

To answer this question, we consulted the 2006 APA resolution on prejudice that informed the 2008 resolution cited in our original paper. This document identifies two forms of prejudice: 1) prejudices that tend to be “overt, blatant, and hostile,” and 2) prejudices that are “more ambiguous and difficult to detect in individual circumstances” (APA, 2006, p. 1).

Regarding the former, we agree with several commentators that there is little evidence of overt disciplinary “rebellion against or attack on religion” (Richardson, p. 4) and/or theistic “individuals or groups” (Alcock, p. 2). We also do not see many examples of the kinds of “irrational” and “unreasoned judgments” (Gergen, p. 1) that mark overt forms of discrimination and bias.

It was never our intention, however, to address these overt expressions of prejudice in our initial paper, because overt theistic prejudices, like other types of blatant prejudice (e.g., racism) “have declined significantly over the past 35 years” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999, p. 101; Utsey, Pinterotto, & Porter, 2008). We focused instead on modern forms of subtle prejudice that have not declined but “occur spontaneously, automatically” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999, p. 101) and “without conscious awareness” (Quillian, 2008, p. 6). We made our focus on this more subtle prejudice explicit on the first page of the original article.

Moreover, these prejudices in the sense of Gadamerian prejudgments are not avoidable; the key is to recognize them and take them into account. Here, we might take issue with Gergen’s call to “thrust such terms [as prejudice] aside” (p. 2). This call, for us, is another form of our title phrase—“the prejudice against prejudice.” His approach to conflict seems more focused on overt forms of prejudice, and thus he attempts to “reduce the focus on difference” (p. 8) to find the common ground among dialogue partners. By contrast, we believe that productive
dialogue cannot take place without recognizing our prejudgments, especially prejudgments that are potentially contradictory or incompatible with the prejudgments of others (see Issue 2). In this sense, psychological researchers have done a service to the cause of flourishing dialogue through their explication of subtler prejudices.

As these researchers have clarified, this type of prejudice can challenge psychology in several relevant ways. First, it is most common among people “who possess strong egalitarian values and who believe they are nonprejudiced” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999, p. 101). This feature is especially tempting for scientists who are often motivated to see themselves as objective and neutral, and thus not prejudiced in any way. A second feature of this prejudice is that discriminatory actions are justified on the basis of some other standard than the prejudice itself, especially those “standards of normative behavior derived from nonstigmatized groups” (APA resolution, p. 2). In the case of psychology, standards such as “empirical verification” and “scientific inquiry” (Alcock, p. 4) are regularly cited as justifications for the disciplinary exclusion of “nonscientific” interlopers, such as theism, which is then never seen as a prejudice. An intriguing third feature of modern prejudice is that the persons discriminated against are often themselves unaware of these prejudices (Crosby, 1984). After all, they have been “trained” to accept these exclusions as if they were factual or inherent in the group itself. The problem is that this kind of closed-system approach to science is quite debatable, and, as we describe in Issue 3, may not even be the current status of psychology.

Psychology manifests these features of prejudice toward theism in ways that are quite similar to modern racism. Consider, for example, the phenomenon of “white flight” in which white families decide to sell their homes (after a black family moved into the neighborhood) on the basis of “other standards” than skin color, such as decreased home values and increased
crime. Similarly, as Alcock explains, “when religious belief and scientific procedure [are] comingled,” scientific inquiry is “hobble[d]” and psychology’s value as a science is decreased (p. 7). Because “the inclusion of a theistic framework in psychology” would open a “Pandora’s box” of troubles (Alcock, p. 4), the neighborhood of psychology would be better off without theism as a resident. Indeed, we would expect psychologists to be quite “respectful,” to use Richardson’s term (p. 4), as they enforce the “standards” of science. Yet, theistic interpretation and inquiry are not even allowed the opportunity to meet those standards (Issue 6).

**Issue 5: Are some approaches to inquiry basically unbiased and neutral?**

A lot depends on what “basically” means in this question. From our perspective, there is a sense in which all methods of inquiry have some neutrality, but no methods have absolute neutrality. In other words, all methods are metaphorical hammers that are not biased against, and thus are neutral to, the pounding of a variety of nails. Still, there are activities that hammers are “biased against,” such as screwing screws and sawing boards. Translated into the present context, our original claim was that the naturalistic philosophy underlying traditional psychological inquiry makes it ill-suited (like the hammer) for theistic inquiry (like the screws). However, we are surprised at the number of commentators who seemed to resist this thesis, asserting that their own particular brand of inquiry is neutral to the theism/naturalism issue, i.e., Alcock on traditional scientific method, Bishop on methodological naturalism, and possibly even Gergen on social constructionism. We agree about the relative neutrality of all these approaches to inquiry, and some, as Richardson correctly contends, are more sympathetic to theism than others. Still, we do not agree that any of them are neutral to or “compatible with” (our term in the initial article) the worldview of the thoroughgoing theist.
The main reason for our disagreement is that such a theist, given our original analysis, supposes the involvement of God as a *first premise*. This means to us that the theist *begins* with God’s involvement in the world, whether formulating a hypothesis, theory, practice, or method of inquiring about the world. God is not a variable to be studied but a premise to be assumed. In this sense, the theist does not formulate a method of inquiry and *then* ask whether God exists or is involved, because this does not treat the involvement of God as *an assumption already made*, which would then guide the conduct of inquiry. In all the other methods of inquiry listed above, the approach in question is *first* formulated without assuming God’s involvement (and thus divine guidance in conducting the inquiry), and *then* the question of God’s involvement might be asked.

Bishop, for example, describes Dennett as being open to the God-involvement question—“without prejudging the existence of a divine being” (p. 4). This approach to inquiry, however, is *not* neutral to theism because God’s involvement is not an open question for the theist. (Of course, naturalists have their own first premises, and thus are not open to certain questions, such as whether “an external world exists” (Bishop, p. 2).) Even if Dennett were to somehow decide that “divine beings must be invoked” (p. 4), this divine entity might be an “add-on god,” using our terminology from the initial paper, because the system of inquiry was already thought to be in place and working efficiently *without* God. God’s involvement, in this case, is not a first premise, an assumption already made; it had to be “proven” or discovered, in which case God is *added to* an already functioning system.

This is a relatively new line of argument, as far as we know, so we want to be open to a continuing dialogue about all these approaches to inquiry. We acknowledge, for instance, that replacements of first premises are possible. Gadamer (2004), for example, seems to describe a
form of inquiry that could conceivably begin without formally assuming God’s involvement and yet the inquirer could become “surprised” by the “coming-into-existence” of a new first premise, such as God’s involvement (p. 116). Of course, the reverse is also possible—the refinement or replacement of a theistic first premise.

Gadamer (2004) is clear, however, that part of this form of inquiry is identifying prejudgments and not assuming an openness or a neutrality to everything. A “hermeneutically trained consciousness must be, from the start, sensitive to the text’s alterity” (p. 271). In the present context this sensitivity might include considering the possibility of God’s involvement. The theist would not deny that many methods work without acknowledging God’s involvement, but this does not necessarily mean that God is uninvolved and the naturalistic understanding of this “work” is correct. The main point here is that no approach to inquiry is absolutely neutral, and one of the virtues of the “interloper” of theism is that it helps us to see this point.

Issue #6: Can theism produce a viable program of psychological research?

If “viable” means being capable of rigorous conventional investigation and/or participating in a plurality of epistemologies, as described in issue #3, then we can answer this question affirmatively. Theism is a different worldview, so it has its own implications for methods (see Issues 3 and 5). Still, even a hammer can pound a few screws, though this is rarely ideal. Analogously, we would argue that even quantitative methods can investigate some theistic topics. The philosophies of science that often underlie quantitative methods in psychology, such as positivism, may not be ideal for theism (e.g., numbers may be impoverished symbols for theistic meanings), but this does not imply that they cannot be used.

To help illustrate what a viable theistic program of quantitative research might look like, we begin here with three features of the research exemplars in our original paper. The first
concerns the designing of studies with theistic factors in mind. For example, Cassiba et al. (2008) (from the original paper) could assess the participant’s experiences of their relationship to God in the same way they assessed their experiences of other relationships—by asking participants directly about them. This assessment could be done by amending or adding questions to the same survey or interview they used to inquire about parental relationships (e.g., experiences of God answering prayers, inspiring their mind, or prompting them to action).

A second feature of a conventional investigation is to consider the possibility of a theistic interpretation of the data. Because data are “underdetermined,” and thus data do not completely determine interpretations (findings), a limited set of alternative interpretations is possible, in principle (Curd & Cover, 1998; Slife & Williams, 1995). In the Cassibba et al. (2008) study, naturalistic factors “failed” to predict the participants’ image of God (p. 1761), and so another possible interpretation is that the participants’ experience of God had some influence on their image of God.¹ We could certainly debate the validity of experience and self-report, but this kind of data is the bedrock of many research programs in psychology.

Consider as a third feature of a more conventional theistic research program the possibility that theoretical advancements would not have to ignore theistic concepts. Our exemplar in the original article was psychologists’ use of Martin Buber’s work. Our point was not that psychologists were overlooking a few of Buber’s theistic factors; our point was that Buber viewed a relationship with God as central to his entire theory. In other words, Buber’s God was not an add-on God. The “God assumption” is an altering rather than an add-on

¹ As C.S. Lewis (1996) put this experience, the theist has “a commerce with something which…proclaims itself sheerly objective…[though] “it is not clothed in our senses” (p. 11). Obviously, Lewis does not assume that a narrow sensory empiricism is the only approach to knowledge and truth.
assumption. If this is correct, then the general inclusion of theism in psychology would permit the Buberian framework to be understood fully and used correctly.

Beyond our original exemplars, we believe that many studies in the psychology of religion could be amended or reformulated to constitute a theistic program of research. Forgiveness research, for example, has historically excluded what many theists would consider essential components of the forgiveness process—receiving forgiveness and the capacity to forgive from God. Indeed, there is typically no mention of God in psychological definitions of forgiveness (e.g., Macaskill, 2005). A theistic program of research, on the other hand, would explicitly consider the possibility of theistic factors in both the definition and study of forgiveness (e.g., Likert-type survey questions about one’s experiences with God). For example, a quantitative study of forgiveness might compare the outcomes of participants whose forgiveness process includes God with participants whose process does not include God. A qualitative study might explore whether experiencing God’s forgiveness facilitates a participant’s capacity to forgive another person.

Even secular psychological topics could be reconceptualized and rendered theistically. Prosocial behavior, a vital topic in secular social psychology, could be viewed from a theistic perspective as God prompting a person to altruistic action. The theist Alvin Plantinga (1997), for example, has argued that naturalistic science has completely misunderstood the prosocial behavior of theistic altruists such as Mother Teresa. Plantinga cites a recent evolutionary psychology study of altruism that points to genetic docility as a prominent cause of Mother Teresa’s altruistic behavior, enfeebling her capacity for normal rationality and jeopardizing her maximization of genetic fitness.
As Plantinga rejoins, no theist “could accept this account as even a beginning of a viable explanation of the altruistic behavior of the Mother Teresas of this world” (Simon and Altruism section, para. 4). Rather, the theistic researcher could consider the possibility of theistic motives, which are no more or less observable than any other motives studied by prosocial researchers, in either a quantitative or qualitative investigation. In other words, there is no question that many theistic “constructs” are not in themselves observed, but this has not kept psychologists from operationalizing and investigating many unobserved constructs (e.g., memory, attitudes, feelings). The theist can do the same, and this is within the conventional epistemological framework of mainstream psychology. A pluralism of epistemologies would be another thing entirely, permitting theistic epistemologies to potentially enrich the discipline.

Some Agreements and Implications

These points at issue, as important as they are, do not capture the relations among the eight comments. Perhaps most prominently, we were gratified and a little surprised, given the provocative nature of our original paper, that half the commentators offered enthusiastic, if qualified, support for our main thesis regarding prejudice. Ken Gergen, for example, is in “full agreement” with our “account of implicit bias against theism in psychology” (p. 1). Frank Richardson states that it is “incontestable” that “a great deal of social science inquiry reflects what Slife and Reber call ‘hidden prejudices’ that make it impossible to investigate or interpret religious experience, beliefs, or practices in a fair or respectful manner, whatever one thinks of them” (p. 1). Likewise, Louise Sundararajan considers our critique so “incisive” that all she can do is “extend” our “insight” (p. 2). And lastly, Hendrika Vande Kemp seems to agree that the world of psychology “excludes” the world of “transcendent” meanings (p. 4). We realize that this agreement does not make a consensus, but what if a prejudice against theism does exist and
is truly pervasive in the discipline? What implications would the recognition of this prejudice have?

Sundararajan and Vande Kemp explore one important implication—psychology would be more open to alternative conceptions. Sundararajan provides an excellent example of the disciplinary benefit of this openness. She compares and contrasts a ganlei alternative to conventional notions of emotion, showing convincingly from our perspective that this alternative should at least be considered. Likewise, Vande Kemp proffers four “sphere[s] of existence” (p.12) that she believes encompass more broadly the investigative potential of psychology. Although this scheme obviously has a lot to recommend it, we worry a bit about her description and clinical example. If God is only involved in the “transpersonal” or “Thou” sphere (if even there; see her clinical example), then is this a form of dualism? If, on the other hand, God is involved in all the spheres of existence, then why have a special sphere for the transpersonal or Thou sphere? A true nondualism would also mean that the physical sciences cannot study merely the “it” or the “impersonal,” as Vande Kemp describes, because the Thou and the transpersonal would also be necessary for any kind of complete understanding. Obviously, as Stenner notes, such alternatives would need to be wary of the dangers of dualism.

Other significant implications of a possible prejudice abound. If naturalism and theism are truly incompatible, then psychology’s own ethics would require that naturalistic therapists inform their theistic clients. Even if Alcock is right and psychology is only biased against theism and not “prejudiced” against “theists,” it might still be important to inform theistic clients of this bias and let them decide the possibility of prejudice for themselves. After all, these therapists would be teaching clients to understand themselves with quite different, perhaps even incompatible, assumptions to their chosen worldview. Similarly, psychological researchers
should inform their readers that their findings—their data interpretations—are not unbiased or neutral descriptions of the psychological world. They are laden with values of one sort or another. Again, the ethics of the discipline would seem to require that psychological researchers identify their assumptions and biases and not present their conclusions as if they were bias- or value-free.
References


